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ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS
by Marc I. Steinberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
A S recent events evidence, attorneys find themselves named with in-
creasing frequency as defendants in securities litigation. The most
A frequent provision invoked by plaintiffs is Section 10(b) of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 19341 (Exchange Act). Depending on the circum-
stances, attorney liability may be predicated on violation of other provisions,
such as Sections 11, 12, and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 19332 (Securities
Act) and Sections 14(a) and 18(a) of the Exchange Act.3 Looking to the
underlying situation as well as the section allegedly violated, both primary
and secondary liability (such as aiding and abetting liability) may be im-
posed. In addition to the invocation of private rights of action, when appro-
priate, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may institute
enforcement actions and the United States Attorney may bring criminal
proceedings.
Actions also have been instituted against lawyers for allegedly violating
the applicable state securities laws. Although many of these statutes are
construed similar to the federal securities laws, some of the state securities
provisions may have a broader reach. 4 In addition, attorneys have found
themselves called "racketeers" based upon application of the Racketeer In-
fluenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).5 This is hardly surprising
* Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School
of Law. Of Counsel, Winstead, Sechrest & Minick. The author has served as an expert wit-
ness in a number of securities malpractice and related actions. The views expressed herein are
solely those of the author.
This article is adapted from a chapter in Professor Steinberg's forthcoming book on corpo-
rate and securities malpractice to be published by the Practising Law Institute.
Portions of this article are derived from M. Steinberg, Securities Regulation: Liaibilities and
Remedies (1991). Copyright Law Journal Seminars-Press. Reprinted with permission. All
rights reserved.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77g(a) (1988).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78h(a), 78r(a) (1988).
4. See, e.g., Marshall v. Quinn-L Equities, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Tex. 1988)
(civil liability alleged under secondary liability provision of the Texas Securities Act against
attorney). See also Colorado v. Preblud, 764 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1988); Prince v. Brydon, 307 Or.
146, 764 P.2d 1370 (1988). See generally J. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW (1986).
5. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1991). See, e.g., Elliott v. Chicago Motor
Club, 809 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1986); Butchers Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d
535 (9th Cir. 1986); Netelkos v. Weinberg, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
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given the prospect that plaintiffs who successfully invoke civil RICO can
recover treble damages and attorneys' fees. 6
This article provides an overview of attorney liability under the federal
securities laws.7 Key aspects of the discussion will focus on such subjects as
private actions under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, aider and abettor
liability, the attorney as a "seller" under Section 12 of the Securities Act,
SEC enforcement actions, and law firm procedures to protect against insider
trading liability.
II. SECURITIES ACT LIABILITY
This portion of the article will focus on three provisions of the Securities
Act - Sections 11, 12, and 17(a).
A. Section 11
Section 11(a) of the Securities Act8 delineates the classes of persons who
are subject to liability for a material9 misstatement or omission contained in
a registration statement (which includes the prospectus). 10 Generally, "any
person acquiring such security" may bring a private cause of action for dam-
ages unless, at the time of purchase, the complainant had knowledge of the
misstatement or omission."1 To recover under Section 11, a plaintiff need
not be in privity with the seller, can seek recovery for purchases made in the
secondary markets (subject to the "tracing" requirement), 12 normally need
not establish reliance, 13 and is not required to show causation (in other
93,219 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Big Apple Indus. Bldgs., Inc., 655 F. Supp.
1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); McMurtry v. Brasfield, 654 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va. 1987); Penturelli
v. Spector Cohen Gadon & Rosen, 640 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Pa. 1986). For further discussion,
see R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 9.11-9.27 (3d ed. 1989).
6. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Caplin &
Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). See
generally discussion and sources cited in M. STEINBERG & R. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRAC-
TICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT §§ 6:33-6:39 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
7. For more extensive treatment, see, e.g., A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES
FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD (1989); L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION (3d ed. 1989); SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES (A. A. Sommer ed. 1985); L. SODER-
QUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS (2d ed. 1990); M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES
REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES (1991).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988).
9. Generally, materiality is based on the concept that a reasonable investor would con-
sider such information important in making his or her investment decision. See Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976).
10. As with other provisions invoking the federal securities laws, note that a means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce must be used in connection with the offer or sale. See
Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 874 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that proof of intrastate
telephone messages adequate to confer jurisdiction).
11. See Section l1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988).
12. See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967); Kirkwood v. Taylor, [1984-
1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,877 (D. Minn. 1984); McFarland v.
Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
13. An exception exists in situations where the plaintiff purchased the securities more
than twelve months after the registration statement's effective date, provided that an "earnings
statement" covering the twelve-month period has been made generally available. In such situ-
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words, the defendant may avoid liability or reduce its monetary exposure by
establishing that the misrepresentation or nondisclosure did not cause the
loss, either totally or in part). 14 Although the issuer is strictly liable, other
defendants in a Section 11 action have a "due diligence" defense.'
5
Included within the enumeration of prospective Section 11 defendants are
experts who "hav[e] prepared or certified any report or valuation which is
used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the state-
ment in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to
have been prepared or certified by him."' 6 Such expertised statements en-
compass opinions issued by counsel, including the rendering of an opinion
with respect to the legality of the securities issued.' 7 Opinions may also be
provided by counsel which are used in connection with the registration state-
ment covering such subjects as discount on capital shares, tax matters, and
liquidation preferences. ' 8 With respect to the furnishing of a "comfort opin-
ion," 19 in order to avoid potential liability under Section 11, "counsel should
ensure that neither the opinion nor its contents appear in the registration
statement." 20 If a material misstatement or omission is contained in any
such expertised portion of the registration statement, the expert has a due
diligence defense, signifying that, after conducting a reasonable investiga-
tion, such expert had reason to believe and in fact did believe that such state-
ations, the plaintiff must show reliance on the misrepresentation or nondisclosure contained in
the registration statement, although "such reliance may be established without proof of the
reading of the registration statement by such person." Section 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(1988); see SEC Rule 158, 17 C.F.R. § 230.158 (1991).
14. See, e.g., Akerman v. Orxy Communications, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 91,680 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1987). The statute of
limitations for bringing a Section I right of action is contained in Section 13 of the Securities
Act ("within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence... [but] in no event
shall any such action be brought ... more than three years after the security was bona fide
offered to the public.").
15. See Section I(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77K(b)(3) (1988).
16. Id.
17. See Items 601(a)(5), 601(b)(5) of Regulation S-K (requiring to be filed as an exhibit
"[a]n opinion of counsel as to the legality of the securities being issued, indicating whether they
will, when sold, be legally issued, fully paid and non-assessable, and, if debt securities, whether
they will be binding obligations of the registrant"). See generally FitzGibbon & Glazer, Legal
Opinions in Corporate Transactions: The Opinion that Stock is Duly Authorized, Validly Issued,
Fully Paid and Nonassessable, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863 (1986).
18. See Items 601(a)(6)-(8), 601(b)(6)-(8) of Regulation S-K; Cheek, Counsel Named in a
Prospectus, 6 REV. SEC. REG. 939, 942-43 (1973) ("[I]t is likely that a court would hold cou-
sel to be an 'expert' in the Section 11 sense with respect to his conclusions and statements as to
the legality of the securities being sold, and as to such matters as tax consequences or patent
validity."); Cooney, The Registration Process: The Role of the Lawyer in Disclosure, 33 Bus.
LAW. 1329 (1978).
19. "A comfort opinion essentially is a statement that, based on counsel's participation in
the preparation of the registration statement and conferences with representatives of the issuer,
underwriters and public accountants, he or she has no reason to believe that the registration
statement violates Section 11." M. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 113
(1989). See SECURITIES UNDERWRITING: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, (K. Bialkin & W.
Grant eds. 1985).
20. M. STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 113.
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ment was accurate. 21
Plaintiffs have argued that attorneys are experts within the meaning of
Section 11 if they draft the registration statement or otherwise provide legal
advice on disclosure issues in connection with its preparation. The courts
have rejected such assertions.22 As succinctly stated by one court: "To say
that the entire registration statement is expertised because some lawyer pre-
pared it would be an unreasonable construction of the statute." 23
Unsuccessful attempts also have been made to hold lawyers and other col-
lateral parties liable under Section 11 for aiding and abetting. 24 Rejection of
this theory frequently has been premised on the fact that Section 11 contains
an exhaustive enumeration of parties subject to suit. As one court reasoned,
"where a statute specifically limits those who may be held liable for the con-
duct described by the statute, the courts cannot extend liability, under a
theory of aiding and abetting, to those who do not fall within the categories
of potential defendants described by the statute."'25
This is not to imply that an attorney who drafts a registration statement or
provides advice in connection therewith (and who is not acting as an expert
within the meaning of Section 11) will necessarily avoid securities law liabil-
ity. Under such circumstances, provided that the requisite elements (such as
the rendering of substantial assistance and the presence of scienter) can be
proved, the attorney can be held liable as an aider and abettor under Section
17(a) of the Securities Act or Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.26
Moreover, when counsel serves as a director of the issuer, potential liabil-
ity under Section 11 arises. If a material misstatement or omission is con-
tained in the registration statement, the lawyer-director may well have an
onerous burden to satisfy his or her due diligence defense. This is particu-
larly true when the lawyer-director has another substantial relationship with
the issuer, such as serving as inside or outside general counsel. 27 For exam-
21. See Section 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77K(b)(3) (1988).
22. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n.22 (1983); Ahem v.
Gaussoin, 611 F. Supp. 1465, 1482 (D. Or. 1985); Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520
F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (D. Minn. 1981).
23. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
24. See, e.g., Quantum Overseas v. Touche Ross & Co., 663 F. Supp. 658, 665 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 593 F. Supp. 612, 616 (D. Minn. 1984); Hagert v.
Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (D. Minn. 1981). But see In re Cae-
sar's Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
25. In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D. Cal.
1976). Note, however, that a lawyer or law firm may have "controlling person" liability under
Section 15 for violations of Section 11 or 12 of the Securities Act. See infra notes 161-175 and
accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 141-60 and accompanying text for further discussion. Cumulative
remedies may be pursued, irrespective whether there is an express right of action available.
Hence, an implied right of action under Section 10(b) exists for materially misleading state-
ments contained in a registration statement. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 380-86 (1983); Chemeton Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,541 (5th Cir. 1983); Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cu-
mulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1982).
27. See generally Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Folk,
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pie, in the seminal BarChris case,28 in concluding that the director who also
served as the company's outside counsel did not meet his due diligence de-
fense, the court reasoned that "more was required of him in the way of rea-
sonable investigation than could fairly be expected of a director who had no
connection with this work."929
As a final comment, the performance of due diligence frequently is dele-
gated to counsel for the issuer and to counsel for the underwriter(s). When
performing such due diligence on a client's behalf, counsel at least must
stand in the client's "shoes." In a given situation, "[tihe extensiveness of the
investigation appropriate may range from that required of an outside direc-
tor who has no other affiliation with the issuer to the extensive verification
required of underwriters in the traditional public offering setting."'30 As
noted above, although not subject to Section 11 liability, counsel conducting
such due diligence on a client's behalf may be subject to suit under the secur-
ities acts' antifraud provisions. Moreover, negligent performance of due dili-
gence services may render the attorney liable for malpractice. 31
B. Section 12
Under certain circumstances, attorneys may find themselves liable as
"sellers" under Section 12 of the Securities Act.32 Pursuant to Section 12(1),
a purchaser of securities is entitled to rescission (or damages if the securities
are no longer owned by the purchaser) against his or her seller if the seller
sells the securities in violation of Section 5.33 Hence, if Section 5 has been
violated (namely, that an exemption from Securities Act registration has not
been perfected), 34 the seller ordinarily is subject to strict liability, with the
proviso that such defenses as the expiration of the statute of limitations 35 or
that the plaintiff is in pari delicto 36 may be raised.
The provision more frequently invoked in this context is Section 12(2)
Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1 (1969);
discussion infra notes 218-28 and accompanying text.
28. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
29. Id. at 690.
30. M. STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 113; see T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REG-
ULATION 274-327 (2d ed. 1990); Frerichs, Underwriter Due Diligence Within the Integrated
Disclosure System - If It Isn't Broken, Don't Fix It, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 386 (1989); Spanner, A
Litigation Perspective on the Prospectus Preparation Process for an Initial Public Offering, 16
SEC. REG. L. J. 115 (1988).
31. See discussion in R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 5.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988).
33. See, e.g., Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1035 (2d Cir. 1979) ("If the plaintiff
owns the stock, he is entitled to rescission but not damages. If [the] plaintiff no longer owns
the stock, he is entitled to damages but not rescission.").
34. Note that the burden of establishing that an exemption from Securities Act registra-
tion has been perfected is upon the party seeking to invoke the exemption. See, e.g., SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-27 (1953).
35. See Section 13 of the Securities Act (Section 12(1) action must be brought "within one
year after the violation upon which it is based [and] [i]n no event.., more than three years
after the security was bona fide offered to the public"); supra note 14.
36. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Ber-
ner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985); Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1990).
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which provides a purchaser with an express right of action against his or her
seller for rescission (or damages if the purchaser no longer owns the securi-
ties)37 where such purchaser acquired the securities by means of a materially
misleading or false statement contained in a prospectus or oral communica-
tion. In a Section 12(2) action, proof of reliance need not be shown by the
plaintiff.38 The seller has a "quasi due diligence" defense, signifying that the
seller may void liability by showing that he or she did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such misrepresentation
or omission. 39
Hence, attorneys may be subject to liability under Section 12 if they are
deemed "sellers." Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter v. Dahl,4°
the lower courts had disagreed as to the definition of "seller" under Section
12. While some courts imposed a strict privity requirement, 41 most courts
relaxed the privity requirement to some extent. Liability was imposed by a
number of courts upon persons as "sellers" for being integrally connected
with, or substantially involved in, the transaction.42
In Pinter, the Supreme Court rejected both of these approaches. While
the decision expressly dealt with the definition of "seller" under Section
12(1), it is reasonable to conclude that the Court's analysis applies as well to
Section 12(2). In this regard, however, the Court stated:
Decisions under § 12(2) addressing the "seller" question are ... rele-
vant to the issue presented to us in this case, and, to that extent, we
discuss them here. Nevertheless, this case does not present, nor do we
take a position on, the scope of a statutory seller for purposes of
§ 12(2).43
Nonetheless, given the statutory framework of Section 12, the lower federal
courts have applied the Pinter analysis to actions brought under either sub-
section (1) or (2) of Section 12."
In Pinter, the Supreme Court, looking at the language and purpose of Sec-
tion 12(1), defined "seller" under that provision as extending to one "who
37. See supra note 33.
38. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1005 (1981) (for recovery purposes under Section 12(2), "a plaintiff need not prove
that he ever received the misleading prospectus.").
39. Id. See the dissenting opinion to the denial of certiorari, 450 U.S. 1005 (Powell, J.
dissenting); M. STEINBERG, supra note 7, § 6.02; Comment, "Reasonable Care" in Section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 372 (1981). For the applicable statute
of limitations for Section 12(2) actions, see Section 13 of the Securities Act; supra note 14.
40. 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
41. See, e.g., Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979); McFarland v. Memo-
rex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
42. See, e.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984); Croy v.
Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980).
43. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 642 n.20.
44. See, e.g., In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 635-36 (3d Cir. 1989); Moore v.
Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1989); Crawford v. Glenns, Inc.,
876 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1989); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 1989);
Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1988). But see First Fin. Say. Bank, Inc. v.
American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,825, 94,835 (E.D.N.C. 1989).
[Vol. 45
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successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to
serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner."'45 Hence,
for purposes of Section 12(1), a "seller" includes: (1) one who owned the
security sold to the purchaser, (2) an agent for a vendor (such as a broker)
who successfully solicited the purchase, (3) one who solicited the purchase
with the intent to personally benefit thereby, and (4) one who, without finan-
cial benefit to himself, solicited the purchase to serve the owner's financial
interests. 4 6
The Court's construction of "seller" permits at least two groups of "par-
ticipants" to avoid Section 12(1) primary liability. First, those persons who
gratuitously provide advice on investment matters to friends, family mem-
bers, and acquaintances are not "sellers" so long as they are not motivated
by a desire to benefit the securities owner or themselves. Second, securities
professionals, such as accountants and lawyers, whose involvement is solely
the performance of their professional duties (e.g., counsel rendering solely
legal advice to a client), are not "sellers." 47
Hence, several lower court decisions handed down since Pinter have held
that counsel who performs solely legal services is not a Section 12 "seller."
4 8
For example, the Second Circuit has opined: "Pinter expressly cautioned
that the draconian provisions of Section 12 must not be extended to include
lawyers . . .who have performed only their usual professional functions
...."-4 On the other hand, once counsel communicates to prospective in-
vestors regarding the substantive aspects of the offering, the risk of incurring
"seller" status arises. "Speaking up the deal" is fraught with danger for
counsel. Although "seller" status may not be imposed when counsel merely
"passes along" offering documents to potential investors, 50 this is an unnec-
essary risk for counsel to incur. Even more troubling is when counsel di-
rectly solicits potential investors, either by transmitting promotional
materials or by oral communication. 51 In such cases, courts will scrutinize
45. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 647-49.
46. Id. at 642-49. Compare the pre-Pinter decision, Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349 (5th
Cir. Unit A July 1981) (attorney whose participation was a substantial factor in causing the
transaction to take place deemed a seller for § 12(2) purposes).
47. See authorities cited infra notes 48-53.
48. See, e.g., Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 855 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989);
Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989); Abell v. Poto-
mac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988); Sellin v. Rx Plus, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1289
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,902 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Marshall v. Quinn-L Equities, Inc., [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,812 (N.D. Tex. 1989); Commins v. Johnson &
Higgins, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,092 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
49. Wilson, 872 F.2d at 1127; accord Moore, 885 F.2d at 537 n.5 ("Courts generally agree
that merely performing professional services, without actively soliciting a purchase of the un-
derlying securities, does not give rise to liability under Section 12.").
50. Moore, 885 F.2d at 536-37 (attorney mailing of private placement memorandum to
prospective investor pursuant to promoter's request "cannot under any view be considered the
kind of solicitation necessary under Pinter").
51. See Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Professional Fin. Manage-
ment, Ltd., 692 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1988).
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the specifics of the attorney's conduct, including the underlying motivation,
to ascertain whether counsel solicited the purchase with the intent "to serve
his own financial interests or those of the securities owner."'52 Given the
ramifications, counsel would be prudent to confine his or her role to solely
that of rendering legal services. 53
The Supreme Court in Pinter did not resolve whether secondary liability
may be imposed under Section 12.54 Although a few courts have approved
of such liability based largely upon an aiding and abetting rationale,5" the
majority of courts have rejected the imposition of secondary liability as inap-
propriate under Section 12.56 Hence, in view of Pinter and lower federal
court decisions limiting the liability of attorneys under Section 12, plaintiffs
alleging federal securities law violations ordinarily must seek relief under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Unlike a Section 12 claim, a plaintiff has
a more difficult burden to succeed in a Section 10(b) action, having to prove
such elements as the defendant's scienter and causation. 57
C. Section 17(a)
Section 17(a) is the Securities Act's antifraud provision.5" Unlike Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act which applies to deception or manipulation in the
purchase or sale of securities, Section 17(a)'s scope is confined to proscribed
activity in the offer or sale context. Today, Section 17(a) is invoked most
frequently in SEC enforcement actions. This is due to the development that
an increasing number of courts decline to recognize the existence of a private
right of action under this section.59
52. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 647-49. See Voyles & Teeter, Section 12 Liability: Attorneys Not
Completely Off the Hook, Bus. LAW. UPDATE 7, 10 (Nov.-Dec. 1990) ("Practically speaking,
even though the attorney does not receive compensation for his solicitation efforts, any partici-
pation in the direct solicitation of potential investors will make it difficult to prove he was not
motivated by his own financial interests or those of his client.").
53. For legal scholarship in the aftermath of Pinter, see Klock, Death of a Theory: Pinter
v. Dahl and the Scope of Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act, 17 SEC. REG. L.J.
408 (1990); Prentice, Section 12 of the 1933 Act: Establishing the Statutory Seller, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 417 (1989); Reece, Would Someone Please Tell Me the Definition of the Term "Seller":
The Confusion Surrounding Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35
(1989); Comment, The Reduction in Seller Liability Under the Securities Act of 1933: Good
News for Securities Professionals, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629 (1989).
54. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 648 n.24.
55. See deBruin v. Andromeda Broadcasting Sys., 465 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Nev. 1979); In
re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
56. See, e.g., In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1989); Schlifke v. Seafirst
Corp., 866 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1989); Wilson v. Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872
F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989); Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., 739 F.2d 1067 (6th Cir. 1984); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 721 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
57. See Significant 1989 Court Decisions, 45 Bus. LAW. 1281, 1285-86 (1990).
Note that, irrespective whether aiding and abetting liability may be imposed under Section
12, potential liability as a controlling person pursuant to Section 15 still exists. See, e.g., In re
ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,881 (C.D.
Cal. 1990) (law firm may be liable as a "controlling person"). See infra notes 161-75 and
accompanying text.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988).
59. See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, (1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 95,458 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Washington Public Power Supply Securities
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Regarding the scope of Section 17(a), the Supreme Court held in United
States v. Naftalin 60 that the provision applies to both the initial and secon-
dary trading markets.6 ' Naftalin's effect thus is to subject fraudulent con-
duct involving the offer or sale of securities, even if occurring in the
aftermarket, to the prohibitions of both Section 10(b) and Section 17(a).62
In this regard, the Supreme Court's holding in Aaron v. SEC 63 is instruc-
tive. There, the Court stated that the Commission need only prove the de-
fendant's negligence for a violation of Section 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3) (but must
establish scienter for a Section 10(b) or Section 17(a)(1) violation). 64 In view
of this holding, Section 17(a) arguably becomes a more attractive enforce-
ment weapon to the SEC than Section 10(b) in the "offer or sale" context.65
If an enforcement action is instituted against an attorney and if a consent
settlement is being negotiated, it may well be in the attorney's interests to
seek to limit the violations alleged in the SEC's complaint and accompany-
ing order to those of Section 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3). Because negligent con-
duct may constitute a violation of these subsections, the attorney can avoid
the adverse impressions of having consented to a violation that contains sci-
enter as a necessary element. 66
III. EXCHANGE ACT LIABILITY
Attorneys may be subject to liability under Section 10(b) 67 either as pri-
mary violators or as aider and abettors. Principles of aiding and abetting
liability are discussed at a later point in this article.68 Although relatively
uncommon, attorneys also may find themselves alleged violators of other
Exchange Act provisions, such as Section 14(a). 69
A. Section 10(b)
The most common situation where attorneys may be held liable as pri-
mary violators of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 70 is by the rendering of mate-
Litigation, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987); Newcome v. Esrey, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,106 (4th Cir. 1988); Landry v. All American Assurance Co., 688
F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982); sources cited in Steinberg, Securities Regulation: Liabilities and
Remedies § 6.03[2] (1991).
60. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
61. Id. at 777-78. The Court also held that the protection afforded by Section 17(a) ex-
tends beyond actual purchasers to include financial intermediaries and that the "in" language
of the section is sufficiently broad to cover the type of fraud alleged in that case. Id. at 772-77.
62. See Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act After Naftalin and Redington, 68
GEO. L.J. 163 (1979).
63. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
64. Id. at 689-97.
65. See Steinberg, supra note 19, at 163.
66. See discussion in M. STEINBERG & R. FERRARA, supra note 6, § 3:01 et seq. For
further discussion, see infra notes 186-202 and accompanying text.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
68. See infra notes 141-60 and accompanying text. Steinberg, Attorney Liabilityfor Client
Fraud, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
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rially false or misleading opinion letters.7' Primary liability also may be
imposed where an attorney, by oral communication or other means, makes
material misrepresentations and half-truths. 72 A number of these actions
seemingly arise in situations when counsel has a financial interest in the
venture.
73
To bring a successful Section 10(b) action, the plaintiff seeking monetary
damages must establish several elements, including that: he or she is a pur-
chaser or seller of the securities;74 manipulation or deception (rather than
"solely" breach of fiduciary duty) 75 occurred in connection with the
purchase or sale;76 the misrepresentation or nondisclosure was material;77
the defendant acted with the requisite scienter,78 constituting at least "reck-
less" conduct; 79 when called for, affirmatively prove that the plaintiff relied80
and exercised due diligence;8 1 there exists the requisite causation between
the defendant's violation and the plaintiff's loss;82 and he or she suffered
damages and the amount of such damages incurred.8 3 In addition, where
liability is premised upon silence, the plaintiff must establish that the princi-
pal alleged violator breached a duty to disclose.8 4 The defendant has a
number of defenses, including the expiration of the statute of limitations 5
and equitable defenses, such as laches, waiver, and in pari delicto.86 As an
71. See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1125 (5th Cir. 1988); Cronin v. Mid-
western Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535,
54142 (2d Cir. 1973).
72. See, e.g., Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) $ 95,241 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
73. See, e.g., Griffin v. McNiff, (1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 95,452
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 (1989);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Disciplinary Rule 5-101 (1980); Nelson,
Firms Reconsider Involvement in Client Ventures, Legal Times, Dec. 5, 1983, at 28.
74. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
75. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
76. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Chemi-
cal Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1984).
77. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 48 U.S. 224 (1988); TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438 (1976) (signifying that a reasonable investor would deem such information im-
portant in making his or her investment decision).
78. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976).
79. See, e.g., Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.
1977); discussion infra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
80. See. e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
81. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir. 1977).
82. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239
(2d Cir. 1974).
83. See generally M. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES (1989).
84. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co.,
858 F.2d 1104, 1124-26 (5th Cir. 1988).
85. There is no statute of limitations contained in the Exchange Act that expressly applies
to Section 10(b) claims. The Supreme Court resolved this issue in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkinda,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991). There, the Court adhered to a uni-
form statute of limitations for Section 10(b) litigation, holding that the action must be initiated
within one year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation and in no event more
than three years after the violation's occurrence. Moreover, the Court ruled that tolling prin-
ciples do not apply to the Section 10(b) statute of limitations.
86. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Ber-
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additional point, although indemnification has been viewed as frustrating the
policies and statutory underpinnings of the securities acts and, hence, is gen-
erally prohibited in this context,87 an overwhelming majority of courts rec-
ognize a right to contribution under Section 10(b).88 The discussion that
follows looks at two critical elements of a Section 10(b) action, scienter and
reliance.89
1. Scienter
With regard to the requisite mental state for Section 10(b) culpability pur-
poses, the Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder9° that scienter
must be proved in private damages actions. The Court asserted that permit-
ting negligent conduct to be actionable in such suits would "nullify the effec-
tiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions" placed upon express
actions created by the securities acts.91 Insofar as actions brought by the
SEC, the Supreme Court subsequently held in the Aaron case that "scienter
is an element of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, regardless of the identity of the
plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought."'92
The Supreme Court defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud" 93 which may be established by "knowing
or intentional misconduct."' 94 Although the Court declined to determine
ner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); M.
STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 127-29.
87. See, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1979) (and cases cited
therein).
88. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. Unit A March
1981), aff'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Hor-
wath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1980); see Goodman, Belgum & McDonald, Contri-
bution and Partial Settlement in Federal Securities Cases, 4 INsights No. 5, at 15 (May 1990);
Loewenstein, Implied Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws: A Reassessment, 1982
DUKE L.J. 543 (1982); Comment, Allocation of Damages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 60
WAsH. U.L.Q. 211 (1982).
Note that Section 11 (f) of the Securities Act contains an express right to contribution. On
the other hand, some recent cases decline to imply a right of contribution under Section 12(2).
See, e.g., Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockridge, 876 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1989) (and cases
cited therein).
89. For a superb analytical treatise of Section 10(b), see A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS,
SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD (1990).
90. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
91. Id. at 210 (referring to Sections 11, 12(2), and 15 of the Securities Act, Sections 9, 18,
and 20 of the Exchange Act).
92. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
93. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
94. Id. at 197. Note that in bringing such actions, plaintiff's counsel should be careful to
avoid Rule 11 sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such sanctions have been
levied against counsel instituting non-meritorious securities fraud actions on behalf of their
clients. See Crookam v. Riley, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,479 (8th
Cir. 1990); MacMillan, Inc. v. American Express Co., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,368 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Feinman v. Schulman Berlin & Davis, [1988-1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,184 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Storage Technology
Partners II v. Storage Technology Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,580 (D. Colo. 1988). See also Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,
493 U.S. 120 (1989) (holding that Rule 11 sanctions may be levied only against the individual
lawyer signing the motion or pleading and not the lawyer's firm).
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whether reckless conduct provided the requisite scienter under Section
10(b), 95 the lower federal courts have nearly unanimously held that primary
liability may be predicated on such culpability. Although a number of for-
mulations have been espoused,96 the majority view adheres to the "highly
reckless" standard.97 Under this standard, conduct is deemed reckless so as
to constitute scienter if such conduct represents "an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care... to the extent that the danger was either
known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been
aware of it."98
An application of this standard may be seen from the Third Circuit's deci-
sion in Eisenberg v. Gagnon.99 In the opinion letter context, an attorney is
reckless within the meaning of Section 10(b) "[w]hen the opinion [rendered]
is based on underlying materials which on their face or under the circum-
stances suggest that they cannot be relied on without further inquiry
. ... ,,100 In such circumstances, counsel's "failure to investigate further may
support an inference that [at the time counsel] expressed the opinion [such
attorney had] no genuine belief that [he or she] had the information on
which [to] predicate that opinion."''°
2 Reliance
Turning to Section 10(b)'s reliance requirement, this element has surfaced
as an issue in several attorney liability cases.' 0 2 In Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States,'0 3 the Supreme Court held that, in a case involving primarily
a failure to disclose, "positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recov-
ery." 04 As interpreted by subsequent courts, upon proof of the materiality
of the nondisclosure, 0 5 the plaintiff enjoys a presumption of reliance which
can be rebutted by the defendant.'°6 This presumption applies only to omis-
sion cases, thereby requiring the plaintiff normally to prove reliance in cases
95. Hockfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
96. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 418 F.2d 1277, 1306 n.98 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
97. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,500 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (collecting cases).
98. Id. at 97,595 (quoting Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40
(7th Cir. 1977)).
99. 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985).
100. Id. at 776.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., DuPont v. Brady, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,376
(2d Cir. 1987); T.J. Rainey & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717
F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983); Roberts v. Heim, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Se. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,431 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Cammer v. Bloom, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,211 (D.N.J. 1990).
103. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
104. Id. at 153-54. Note that such reliance must be reasonable. See Roberts v. Heim,
[1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,431 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (sophisticated
investor could reasonably rely on opinions rendered by a law firm in a confidential offering
memorandum).
105. See, e.g., Kramer v. Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1982).
106. See, e.g., Dupont v. Brady, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,376
(2d Cir. 1987) (applying principle in case involving defendant law firm).
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involving affirmative misrepresentation. 0 7 In this regard, although most
courts have found the presumption appropriate in cases of "half-truths"
under Rule lOb-5(2),' 0 8 a few courts hold a contrary view. For example, in
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,109 the Fifth Circuit held that the pre-
sumption of reliance in the plaintiff's favor applies only to cases involving
"primarily a failure to disclose, implicating the first or third subparagraph of
... Rule [10b-5] [and not to cases involving] primarily a misstatement or
failure to state a fact necessary to make those statements not misleading,
classified under the second subparagraph of the Rule." 0
The Huddleston analysis appears misplaced. Looking at the language of
Rule lOb-5(2), the omission component of a half-truth is the principal ele-
ment. Moreover, for a court to determine whether each individual case in-
volves primarily half-truths or "pure" nondisclosures would necessarily
present a difficult procedural task. These cases would frequently involve
conjecture, the very consequence the Affiliated Ute presumption rationale
was intended to avoid."' Lastly, in many cases, the burden placed on a
plaintiff to show positive proof of reliance would be equally as rigorous irre-
spective of whether pure nondisclosures or half-truths are implicated. Ac-
cordingly, pure nondisclosures and half-truths should be deemed equivalent
for Rule lOb-5 presumption of reliance purposes." 2
Plaintiffs also may enjoy a presumption of reliance by invoking the "fraud
on the market" theory. This theory postulates that investors assume that the
market price of a security is determined by the available material informa-
tion and that no unsuspected fraudulent conduct has affected the price. The
use of this theory to apply a rebuttable presumption of reliance received
Supreme Court approbation in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson." 3
In Basic, the Court quoted a lower court decision which explained the
rationale of the fraud on the market theory in the following terms:
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor's reliance upon
information is into the subjective pricing of that information by that
investor. With the presence of a market, the market is interposed be-
tween seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the inves-
107. See, e.g., Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146, 1157 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981).
108. See, e.g., Continental Grain, Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 411-12 (8th
Cir. 1979); Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 545, 558 (1st Cir. 1978); Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos,
527 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (6th Cir. 1975).
109. 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. Unit A March 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375
(1983).
110. Id. at 548. Accord Cavalier Carpets, Inc. v. Caylor, 746 F.2d 749 (11th Cir. 1984).
111. See Memorandum of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, on Petition for Rehearing and Rehear-
ing en Banc at 21-24, Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981). See
generally Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule l0b-5, 88
HARV. L. REv. 584 (1975).
112. Moreover, the plaintiff may satisfy this requirement through "indirect" or "third
party" reliance. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot,
459 U.S. 1027 (1982) ("We find no support in the law for the district court's distinction be-
tween primary and secondary reliance."); Walsh v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F. Supp. 80 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
113. 485 U.S. at 242-49.
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tor in the processed form of a market price. Thus the market is
performing a substantial part of the valuation process performed by the
investor in a face-to-face transaction. The market is acting as the un-
paid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the information
available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.' 14
The Supreme Court's decision in Basic recognized the reality of the mod-
em securities markets involving the trading of hundreds of millions of shares
on a daily basis, and that most ordinary investors do not read corporate
reports or press releases. Acknowledging the presence of impersonal trading
markets, the Court relied in part on economic theory and empirical studies
to support its holding. In so ruling, the Court promoted the use of the class
action to redress Section 10(b) violations. If the Court had required positive
proof of individualized reliance from each plaintiff, individual issues may
have predominated over the common ones, thereby precluding the pursuit of
class actions in this context. Hence, the Court's decision looked to policy
grounds as well to help ensure that ordinary investors have a viable recourse
when they are defrauded in the impersonal trading markets.' 5 Accord-
ingly, the Court concluded:
An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does
so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly
available information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance
on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed
for purposes of a Rule lOb-5 action." 16
Post-Basic, the fraud on the market theory has been frequently invoked
by the lower courts.' ' 7 As seen from both the majority opinion and Justice
White's dissent,"18 however, the presumption of reliance is rebuttable. For
example, in the Apple Computer Securities Litigation,"19 the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the materially misleading statements had been corrected in
the market due to extensive coverage by the press. Hence, because the press
had comprehensively documented problems with the products manufactured
by the defendant, the information was made "credibly available" to the mar-
ket by other sources. 120
A more expansive version of the fraud on the market theory applies the
114. Id. at 990 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
115. Basic, 485 U.S. at 242-49.
116. Id. at 246-49.
117. See, e.g., Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied
485 U.S. 959 (1988); Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (alleged
accountant liability); Cytryn v. Cook, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95.409 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Cammer v. Bloom, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,211 (D.N.J. 1990) (alleged attorney liability).
118. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 253-57. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119. In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989).
120. Id. at 1115. The court nonetheless stressed the limits of its holding: "In order to avoid
Rule lob-5 liability, any material information which insiders fail to disclose must be transmit-
ted to the public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively counterbal-
ance any misleading impression created by the insiders' one-sided representations." Id. at
1116. See also Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.




theory to the offering context where no active trading market exists for the
issuer's stock. The leading case is Shores v. Sklar 121 in which the Fifth Cir-
cuit sitting en banc adopted the theory, with ten judges dissenting. The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the theory's validity in this context.
In Shores, the plaintiff purchased bonds without reading the offering cir-
cular. He alleged in a Section 10(b) cause of action that the defendants had
perpetrated a fraudulent scheme on the investment community by bringing
unmarketable securities onto the open market. Invoking the fraud on the
market theory, the court held that an investor is entitled to rely on the integ-
rity of the market to the extent that the securities offered for sale are entitled
to be in the market place. To recover under this theory, the plaintiff must
establish that the bonds would never have been issued or marketed. Proof
that the bonds would have been offered at a lower price is not sufficient. 122
Thus, "the fraudulent scheme [must be] so pervasive that without it the is-
suer would not have issued, the dealer could not have dealt in, and the buyer
could not have bought [the securities], because they would not have been
offered at any time."1 23 A number of courts subsequent to Shores, including
in cases involving attorneys as defendants, 124 have adopted that decision's
rationale. 1 2 5
B. Other Exchange Act Provisions
Although of far less frequent application, attorneys may be subject to lia-
bility under other provisions of the Exchange Act. For example, Section
18(a) 126 provides for an express damages remedy when an investor
purchases or sells a security in reliance upon a materially false or misleading
statement that is contained in a report or document filed with the SEC under
the Exchange Act, with the proviso that such statement affects the price of
the security.1 27 "Because of Section 18(a)'s strict reliance and causation re-
quirements, a suit based solely on Section 18(a) evidently has never suc-
ceeded." 128 Nonetheless, given that an increasing number of investors are
receiving a registrant's Annual Report on Form 10-K, it is plausible that a
legal opinion contained in such a document may give rise to liability, pro-
121. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en banc).
122. Id. at 469-71.
123. Id. at 464 n.2.
124. See, e.g., T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717
F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180
(W.D. Mo. 1983). See also Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988) (fraud-
on-the-market theory not applied as Shores criteria not met).
125. See, e.g., Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Gorsey v. I.M. Simon
& Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,996 (D. Mass, 1990); Stin-
son v. Van Valley Dev. Corp., 719 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1989). But see Peil v. Speiser, 806
F.2d 1154, 1161 n.10 (3d Cir. 1986) ("While this presumption [of reliance] is plausible in
developed markets, it may not be in the case of a newly issued stock."). See generally Carney,
The Limits of the Fraud on the Market Theory, 44 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1989).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988).
127. Section 18(a) contains a "good faith" defense. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 211-12 n.31 (1976).
128. M. STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 142 n.90.
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vided, of course, that the requirements of Section 18(a) are satisfied. 129
Other remedies include Sections 14(a), 14(e), 20(a), and 29(b). 130 Of these
remedies in the attorney liability context, Section 14(a), other than Section
20(a), is likely to be the one most frequently invoked. Section 14(a) and,
more particularly Rule 14a-9131 promulgated thereunder, proscribe the so-
licitation of proxies which contain materially false or misleading statements.
As the Supreme Court has held, there exists a private right of action under
Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9.1 32 Generally, provided that the materiality of
the misstatement or omission is shown and that such misstatement or omis-
sion had "a significant propensity to affect the voting process," individual
proof of reliance is not required.133
Opinions rendered by attorneys may be contained in proxy statements and
thereby come within Section 14(a)'s reach. The attractiveness of the Section
14(a) remedy, even in situations where Section 10(b) may be invoked, is that
a number of courts hold that negligent conduct is sufficient for culpability
purposes.' 34 This view is by no means unanimous. For example, the Sixth
Circuit, in requiring that scienter be proven in a Section 14(a) action against
accountants, reasoned:
Federal courts created the private right of action under Section 14, and
they have a special responsibility to consider the consequences of their
rulings and to mold liability fairly to reflect the circumstances of the
parties. Although we are not called on in this case to decide the stan-
dard of liability of the corporate issuer of proxy material, we are influ-
enced by the fact that the accountant here, unlike the corporate issuer,
129. Note that this analysis also would apply when such opinions are contained in proxy
statements filed with the SEC. In such cases, however, a plaintiff would prefer to invoke the
more attractive Section 14(a) remedy. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
130. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78n(a), (c), 78t(a), 78cc(b) ( West 1981 & Supp. 1991). Section
14(e) prohibits deceptive conduct in connection with a tender offer. Section 29(b) provides for
a right of rescission in certain situations. Section 20(a) deals with controlling person liability
and is discussed infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text. See M. STEINBERG, supra note 7,
§§ 9.03[7], 9.03[8], 11.08[3].
131. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9 (1991).
132. J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,
111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
133. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970). With respect to the issue
of causation, see Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
134. See, e.g., Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 92,326 (8th Cir. 1985); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761,
777-78 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973).
For example, the Third Circuit in Gould reasoned:
The language of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9(a) contains no suggestion of a
scienter requirement, merely establishing a quality standard for proxy material.
The importance of the proxy provision to informed voting by shareholders has
been stressed by the Supreme Court, which has emphasized the broad remedial
purpose of the section, implying a need to impose a high standard of care on the
individuals involved. And, unlike Sections 10(b) and 18 of the Act, which en-
compass activity in numerous and diverse areas of securities markets and corpo-
rate management, Section 14(a) is specially limited to materials used in soliciting
proxies. Given all of these factors the imposition of a standard of due diligence
as opposed to actual knowledge or gross negligence is quite appropriate.
Gould, 535 F.2d at 777-78.
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does not directly benefit from the proxy vote and is not in privity with
the stockholder. Unlike the corporate issuer, the preparation of finan-
cial statements to be appended to proxies and other reports is the daily
fare of accountants, and the accountant's potential liability for rela-
tively minor mistakes would be enormous under a negligence
standard. 135
Nonetheless, a number of courts disagree with the Sixth Circuit's rationale
and apply a negligence standard against all primary defendants in a Section
14(a) action, including professionals. 136
IV. SECONDARY LIABILITY
Secondary liability may be imposed against attorneys and their law firms
in both private suits and SEC enforcement actions. Aiding and abetting
principles normally arise in the Section 10(b) setting and less frequently
under Section 17(a). 137 Occasionally, conspiracy is also alleged. 138 Law
firms must also be wary of being charged with controlling person 139 and
respondeat superior liability. 14
A. Aiding and Abetting Liability
Although the Supreme Court has thus far declined to resolve the issue, 14'
the lower federal courts have universally held that aiding and abetting liabil-
ity is appropriate under the federal securities laws. 142 Although the exact
content of the various elements giving rise to aiding and abetting liability is
still being refined by the courts,' 43 the cases generally set forth three prereq-
uisites to the imposition of such liability:
(1) the existence of a securities law violation by the primary (as op-
posed to the aiding and abetting) party;
135. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, 623 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1980); accord Zatkin v.
Primuth, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,832 (S.D. Cal. 1982).
136. See Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1988) (negligence stan-
dard applied to fairness opinion furnished by investment banker); see also Bertoglio v. Texas
Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630 (D. Del. 1980); Comment, Proxy Regulation: Ensuring Accurate
Disclosure Through a Negligence Standard, 56 NoTRE DAME LAW. 579 (1981).
Note that, if solely injunctive relief is sought in the proxy context, a court may order such
relief based on the objective sufficiency of the disclosure document(s). See Ash v. LFE Corp.,
525 F.2d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1975).
137. See infra notes 141-60, 191-202 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Danca v. Wakefield Ready-Mixed Concrete Co., Inc., [1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,361 (D. Mass. 1987) (lawyer may be held as a conspirator in
connection with an alleged securities fraud).
139. See infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text. Note that individual lawyers also may
be held liable as controlling persons if they, for example, are deemed to control the defendant
board of directors.
140. See infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191 n.7 (1976).
142. See, e.g., SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F,2d 218, 223-27 (6th Cir. 1982);
SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980); ITf v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d
909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980).
143. See the different formulations discussed in Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abet-




(2) "knowledge" of this violation on the part of the aider and abettor;
and
(3) "substantial assistance" by the aider and abettor in the achievement
of the primary violation.'"
Securities attorneys all too often find themselves alleged to be aiders and
abettors of their client's or a third party's securities fraud.' 45 With respect
to whether the alleged aider and abettor had the requisite "knowledge" for
culpability purposes, several courts hold that reckless conduct suffices where
there is a fiduciary or comparable duty owed to the complainant. 46 On the
other hand, according to some courts, where no such duty exists, the imposi-
tion of aider and abettor liability "requires something closer to an actual
intent to aid in a fraud."' 147 Nonetheless, recklessness may suffice where the
alleged aider and abettor derives economic benefits from the wrongdoing 4
or has reason to foresee that third parties will be relying on his or her
conduct. 149
144. ITT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); see Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1986). For a somewhat different formulation
applied by several courts, see SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974): "[A] person may
be held as an aider and abettor only if some other party has committed a securities law viola-
tion, if the accused party had general awareness that his role was part of an overall activity
that is improper, and if the accused aider-abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the
violation." Id. at 1316. See SEC v. Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1986); Cleary v. Perfec-
tune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 778-80 (1st Cir. 1983).
The Seventh Circuit apparently has the most restrictive standard for imposing aiding and
abetting liability. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th
Cir. 1986) (requiring the plaintiff to "show that each person alleged to be an aider, abettor, or
conspirator himself committed one of the 'manipulative or deceptive' acts or otherwise met the
standards of direct liability"). For a critical assessment of the Seventh Circuit's approach, see
Feldman, The Breakdown of Securities Fraud Aiding or Abetting Liability: Can a Uniform
Standard Be Resurrected?, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 45 (1991).
145. For fairly recent cases involving lawyers alleged to be aiders and abettors under Sec-
tion 10(b), see, e.g., Renovitch v. Kaufman, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
95,313 (7th Cir. 1990); Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989);
Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297
(6th Cir. 1987); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986);
Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt and Heuer, P.C., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,455 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Ackerman v. Schwartz, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 95,009 (N.D. Ind. 1990); In re National Smelting of New Jersey, Inc. Bond-
holders' Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,898 (D.N.J. 1990);
Shumate v. McNiff, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,897 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); In re Citisource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); SEC v. Electronics
Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1988), aff'd, 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989); Lubin
v. Sybedon Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 93,934 (S.D. Cal.
1988); Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362 (D.
Conn. 1987).
146. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1988). A
comparable duty, for example, exists where the alleged aider and abettor owes a disclosure
obligation to the complainants. See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1126 (5th Cir.
1988); SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Conn. 1988), aff'd, 891
F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Where there is a duty of disclosure to the defrauded party, reckless
conduct satisfies the scienter requirement for aider and abettor liability.") (citing cases).
147. See, e.g., Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 485
(2d Cir. 1979).
148. See, e.g., Walck v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 791 n.18 (3d Cir. 1982).
149. See, e.g., Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,898
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For example, in one such case involving attorneys charged with aiding
and abetting under Section 10(b), the court asserted that "it is reasonably
foreseeable that investors would rely on the expertise of the professionals
that draft offering memoranda and tax opinions."' 150 As a consequence, the
defendant attorneys assumed "the obligation to not act in reckless disregard
of the truth when they [undertook] the drafting of such documents." 151 In
another case, the court concluded that attorneys are subject to liability as
aiders and abettors on a recklessness standard "if it is reasonably foreseeable
that potential investors will rely on documents they draft, they omit material
information or include erroneous information in reckless disregard of the
truth." 152 The courts also have made clear, however, that merely preparing
offering documents or serving as special counsel does not by itself warrant an
inference that the attorney acted with the requisite degree of reckless con-
duct sufficient to impose liability. 153
In those jurisdictions where there must exist a fiduciary or comparable
duty in order to impose liability on an aider and abettor for reckless conduct,
plaintiffs frequently will have a difficult task in successfully bringing Section
10(b) actions against attorneys (unless such attorneys themselves engaged in
misrepresentations and omissions, such as in the issuance of a fraudulent
opinion letter).' 5 4 Where an attorney in these jurisdictions owes no duty to
the complainant and performs solely his or her normal tasks "constituting
the daily grist of the mill,' 55 conscious intent to aid the violation must be
shown.156 As the Fifth Circuit stated in Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.,' 57
where the defendant law firm owed no independent duty to the plaintiff and
rendered only customary legal services, clear proof of intent to violate the
securities law must be shown.'58 To establish such intent, plaintiffs must
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 623 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1980); cases cited in notes 150-
153 infra.
150. Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362,
1368 (D. Conn. 1987).
151. Id.
152. SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 891 F.2d
457 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 961 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir. 1983) (attorney alleged as aider and abettor)).
153. See In re Citisource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (ob-
serving that although "a certain degree of involvement in the affairs of an issuer and/or its
principals might warrant... an inference [of recklessness], the mere fact of one's status as
special counsel does not, by itself, indicate that degree") (citing Vereins-Und Westbank AG v.
Carter, 639 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)); Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F.
Supp. 1069 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
154. See, e.g., Renovitch v. Kaufman, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,313 (7th Cir. 1990); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988); Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986).
155. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975).
156. Id. at 97 ("Conversely, if the method or transaction is atypical or lacks business justifi-
cation, it may be possible to infer the knowledge necessary for aiding and abetting liability."
In addition, "the assistance must be substantial before liability can be imposed under [Rule]
lob-5.").
157. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988).
158. Id. at 1127-28.
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prove more than that danger signs were ignored. 159 Given the difficulty of
proving such conscious intent, the Abell decision should please the defense
bar. 160
R Controlling Person Liability
Individual attorneys and law firms may be held liable as "controlling per-
sons" under the federal securities laws. For example, law firms and individ-
ual partners, depending on the circumstances, may be deemed controlling
persons of fellow lawyers in such firms who commit primary violations.' 6'
Moreover, counsel may be deemed a controlling person because of the influ-
ence he or she exerts over certain primary defendants, such as members of a
company's board of directors. 162 Likewise, a particular issuer may be under
the control of a law firm.' 63 However, it should be recognized that the cir-
cumstances in which attorneys that provide legal advice and draft disclosure
documents are held to be controlling persons of their clients and affiliated
persons should be rare. This is due to the fact, as recognized by the Seventh
Circuit, that the "ability to persuade and give counsel is not the same thing
as 'control,' which almost always means the practical ability to direct the
actions" of the persons given such legal advice. 64
Turning to the applicable legal standards, Section 15 of the Securities Act
imposes joint and several liability on any person who controls a person liable
under Section 11 or 12 "unless the controlling person had no knowledge of
or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.' 65 Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act provides that "every person who.., controls any
person liable under any provision of this title ... shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling per-
son acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or
acts constituting the violation or cause of action."' 166 As has been pointed
out, "[t]he reason for this difference in language is hard to fathom, especially
since Section 15 of the 1933 Act was amended in the bill which enacted the
159. Id. at 1128.
160. See generally Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical
Examination, 52 ALBANY L. REV. 637 (1988); Humphreys, Aiding and Abetting Liability of
Accountants in Securities Fraud Cases, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 375 (1990); Kuehnle, Secondary
Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws - Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Per-
son and Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313 (1988).
161. See generally G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981).
Law firms should be especially careful in the insider trading context. See infra notes 221-230
and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Seidel v. Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 616 F. Supp. 1342 (D.N.H.
1985).
163. See, e.g., In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., (1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,881 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
164. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
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1934 Act, and harder still to interpret.' 67
The term "control" is not defined in the securities acts. Pursuant to rule,
however, the SEC has defined the term to encompass "the possession, di-
rectly or indirectly, of the power to cause the direction of the management
and policies of a person .... ,,"68 The courts are generally in accord with
this standard. Hence, the Fifth Circuit held that control was established
when the defendant "had the requisite power to directly or indirectly control
or influence corporate policy."' 169 Examining the case law in other circuits,
the Third Circuit similarly opined that, in determining whether one is a con-
trolling person, the courts "have given heavy consideration to the power or
potential power to influence and control the activities of a person as opposed
to the actual exercise thereof."' 70
As stated above, Section 20(a) absolves the controlling person of liability if
he or she acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the
violation. The statutory language appears clear in placing the burden of
proof on the controlling person to establish the good faith defense. This
view has been overwhelmingly adopted.' 7'
The requisite conduct sufficient to meet the good faith defense should de-
pend on the particular facts and circumstances. 172 Although negligence is
not sufficient to impose liability, 73 a more relaxed form of reckless conduct
should suffice. 174 In determining whether the controlling attorney or law
firm acted "recklessly," the courts should look to the customary norms and
realistic practicalities of the legal profession. 175
C. Respondeat Superior Liability
Under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal is lia-
ble for the torts committed by its employee when such agent acts within the
course and scope of his or her employment and with actual or apparent au-
thority.' 76 The issue arises whether this common law principle is an appro-
167. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1143 (5th ed. 1982).
168. Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1991).
169. G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981).
170. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1975).
171. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,500, at 97,600 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (and cases cited therein) (holding, inter
alia, that broker-dealer is controlling person of independent contractors and that broker-dealer
has burden to show that it "maintained and enforced a reasonable and proper system of super-
vision and internal control").
172. See Note, The Burden of Control: Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1019, 1036 (1973).
173. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209 n.28 (1976).
174. See G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 960 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981)
("Under our holding, the degree of recklessness required for liability under the controlling
person doctrine is less than for noncontrolling persons under [previous decisions] which spoke
of a severe form of recklessness.").
175. See M. STEINBERG, supra note 7, § 10.03; Staudt, "Controlling"Securities Fraud: Pro-
posed Liability Standards for Controlling Persons Under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, 72
MINN. L. REV. 930 (1988).
176. See Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir.
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priate basis for imposing vicarious liability against law firms under the
federal securities laws.
Generally speaking, a fairly small number of courts preclude respondeat
superior liability, reasoning that to hold otherwise would effectively nullify
the controlling person provisions. 177 Nonetheless, the overwhelming major-
ity view is that agency principles may be applied to hold employers liable
under the securities laws for the proscribed conduct of their employees
(while acting within the scope of their employment).178 Respondeat superior
liability also has been imposed in SEC administrative 179 and injunctive 80
proceedings.
These courts reason that confining such liability to that provided by the
controlling person provisions "would contradict the pervasive application of
agency principles in nearly all other areas of the law."' 8 ' As importantly, by
enacting the controlling person provisions, Congress intended to supple-
ment, rather than supplant, common law agency principles so as to reach
classes of persons who have no agency or employment relationship with the
individual who actually committed the proscribed acts.' 82
It bears mentioning that several courts that have embraced the propriety
of respondeat superior liability thus far have declined to address the applica-
tion of this doctrine outside of the broker-dealer or similar context. 18 3 Lan-
guage contained in a number of decisions, however, indicates that the
doctrine of respondeat superior may be invoked against law firms based on
the actions of its employees in certain situations. For example, the Third
Circuit found application of the doctrine appropriate where a stringent duty
to supervise employees exists which arises from the investing public's trust
and confidence in the firm involved. Hence, in Sharp v. Coopers &
1980). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219(1), 257, 258, 261; Seavey, Spec-
ulations as to "Respondeat Superior", 1934 HARV. LEGAL ESSAYS 433.
177. See, e.g., Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981).
178. See, e.g., In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 784 F.2d 29, 32-34 (1st Cir.
1986); Henrickson v. Henrickson, 640 F.2d 880, 887-88 (7th Cir. 1981); Marbury Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980).
An exception to this principle applies in cases arising under Section 20A of the Exchange
Act. In such cases, contemporaneous traders seeking damages based on alleged insider trading
violations cannot invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior against the insider trader's em-
ployer, such as a law firm.
179. See, e.g., In re Suttro Brothers & Co., 41 S.E.C. 470 (1963); In re Cady Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); In re H.F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833 (1948). See also In re Carter,
[1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (SEC 1981) (law firm not named in
the administrative complaint).
180. See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975).
181. See Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir.
1980). Courts also rely on Section 16 of the Securities Act and Section 28(a) of the Exchange
Act which provide that the rights and remedies provided by the respective Acts shall be in
addition to any and all rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,500 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc). The language in Hollinger, on the other hand, is
quite broad. See id. at 97,600-01 ("holding that § 20(a) was intended to supplement ... the
common law theory of respondeat superior as a basis for vicarious liability in securities cases").
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Lybrand,184 the court imposed respondeat superior liability upon an account-
ing firm for a tax opinion letter fraudulently drafted by an employee and
ultimately signed by a partner in the partnership name, reasoning:
When the firm's public representations are designed to influence the in-
vesting public, the firm should not be shielded from compensating per-
sons who suffered from reckless or knowing acts by its employees.
Otherwise, it could immunize itself from liability by constructing a
"Chinese wall" between its employees and partners, allowing only the
former to draft opinion letters. Partners, with their greater experience
and knowledge, would have a strong incentive to avoid using their ex-
pertise to benefit the investors to whom opinion letters are directed.
This incentive can be reversed only by recognizing an absolute duty on
the part of the firm, which acts through its partners, to supervise em-
ployees closely whenever its representations are designed to influence
the investing public. Protection of investors is, after all, the primary
purpose of the securities laws. 185
V. SEC ENFORCEMENT
The SEC has instituted both administrative and judicial enforcement ac-
tions against attorneys. A number of these actions are addressed earlier in
this article.
A. SEC Actions for Injunctive Relief
The law is clear that the SEC must show more than a violation of the
securities laws in order to procure injunctive relief.'8 6 In addition, the SEC
must show a "reasonable likelihood" that, absent the ordering of an injunc-
tion, the defendant will engage in future violations. '8 7 More recently, due to
judicial recognition of the adverse collateral consequences that an injunction
would impose,' 88 courts have been more reluctant to grant such relief.189
Nonetheless, the SEC has successfully obtained injunctive relief against at-
torneys in certain situations. 19°
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Aaron was briefly addressed
184. 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
185. Id. at 184. See generally Ferrara & Sanger, Derivative Liability in Securities Law:
Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1007 (1983); Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of
1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80 (1981); Marshall, Control Person Liability, 13 REV. SEC. REG. 927
(1980).
186. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 700-01 (1980).
187. See, e.g., SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980).
188. See generally M. STEINBERG & R. FERRARA, supra note 6, §§ 5:10-5:13; Andre, The
Collateral Consequences of SEC Injunctive Relief- Mild Prophylactic or Perpetual Hazard?,
1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 625.
189. See, e.g., SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1980); Eisenberg, SEC Injunc-
tive Actions, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 901 (1987); Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions -
Standards for Their Imposition, Modification and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27 (1980).
190. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Electronics Warehouse,
Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1988), aff'd, 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989). But see SEC v.
Haswell, 654 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981), and SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.
Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), where the SEC failed to obtain injunctive relief against the subject
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earlier in the article, the case is worthy of further comment. There, the
Court held that the SEC must prove scienter in civil enforcement actions to
enjoin violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule lOb-5 promul-
gated thereunder, and Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, but need not
prove scienter for violations of Section 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3). 191 With re-
spect to the issuance of an injunction "upon a proper showing" for violations
of Section 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3), the Court pointed out that "nothing on the
face of § 20(b) of the 1933 Act or § 21(d) of the 1934 Act purports to impose
an independent requirement of scienter."' 92
Based on Aaron and certain lower court decisions, an argument can be
made that if the primary violation does not require scienter, neither does the
secondary violation. Two Second Circuit decisions supporting this proposi-
tion are SEC v. Coven 193 and SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. 194 Both of these cases
involved attorneys who had injunctions ordered against them. In view of the
"knowledge" requirement for aiding and abetting liability, which apparently
requires at least recklessness, 95 these cases may no longer be good law inso-
far as the requisite mental state is concerned. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court in Aaron premised its decision on the relevant statutory lan-
guage. Applying this rationale, an argument may be set forth that scienter is
not required in SEC injunctive actions brought against secondary parties for
alleged violations of Section 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act as
well as other provisions with similar statutory language. 196
The better approach is that, in all practicality, injunctions issued against
attorneys normally should be based on at least reckless conduct, irrespective
of the statutory provision violated. As the Aaron court pointed out, "the
degree of intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's past conduct" is
an important factor in determining whether the SEC has "establish[ed] a
sufficient evidentiary predicate to show that such future violation may oc-
cur."' 197 The presence or lack of scienter is "one of the aggravating or miti-
gating factors to be taken into account" in a court's exercise of its equitable
jurisdiction.' 98 A concurring opinion departed somewhat from the major-
ity's rationale, asserting that the SEC "will almost always" be required to
show that the defendant's past conduct was more culpable than negli-
attorneys. See generally Mathews, SEC Injunctive Proceedings Against Attorneys, 36 Bus.
LAW. 1819 (1981).
191. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 689-95.
192. Id. at 696.
193. 581 F.2d 1020, 1029 (2d Cir. 1978). In holding that the subject lawyer aided and
abetted a violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, the court asserted that the lawyer
"should have been able to conclude that his letter was likely to be used in furtherance of illegal
activity."
194. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that attorney's negligently prepared opinion
letter supports the imposition of aiding and abetting liability under Section 5 of the Securities
Act).
195. See supra notes 141-60 and accompanying text.
196. But see Mathews, supra note 190, at 1826 (arguing proof of recklessness required).




gence. 199 The concurring opinion concluded that "[a]n injunction is a dras-
tic remedy, not a mild prophylactic, and should not be obtained against one
acting in good faith. ' '2°° Particularly in the case of professionals who have
previously had unblemished records, this approach makes a great deal of
sense.201 A different result should follow, however, if the attorney incurred
corporate or securities law liability in the fairly recent past.202
As an additional point, the SEC, as part of the settlement negotiation pro-
cess in both administrative and judicial proceedings, has induced law firms
to agree to certain undertakings. These may include implementing more ef-
fective internal law firm procedures and adopting certain policies with re-
spect to retention of prospective clients.203 For example, in one Rule 2(e)
proceeding, the law firm stipulated that it would adopt the following
procedures:
(1) Every two weeks, members of the firm will meet and discuss all of
their active cases. Affirmative approval of each partner is required
before the issuance of any legal opinion. (2) The firm will undertake an
appropriate investigation in connection with acting as bond counsel in-
cluding, among other things, obtaining independently-audited financial
statements and inquiring into the background of the various parties
connected with the offering .... (3) An appropriate "engagement let-
ter" will be sent to all interested parties, emphasizing that the firm's
duty is to the issuer and bondholders .... (4) The firm will require that
it receive independently-audited financial statements, representations
from appropriate interested persons concerning the accuracy and com-
pleteness of the statements about them in any offering circulars, and a
statement from counsel for any lessee or guarantor that such counsel
has reviewed the offering circular and is aware of no inaccuracies
therein. (5) Partners and associates of the firm will attend, at least annu-
ally, municipal bond workshops and seminars.2°4
199. Id. at 703 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
200. Id.
201. See SEC v. Haswell, 654 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1981) (injunction not ordered against
lawyer).
202. See language in SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 654-57 (9th Cir. 1980).
203. See, e.g., SEC v. Cohen, SEC Litigation Release No. 9050 (D.D.C. 1980); In re Keat-
ing, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,124 (SEC
1979); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) $ 96,027 (D.D.C. 1977).
204. In re Ferguson, Securities Act Release No. 5523, 5 SEC Docket 37 (1974). As an-
other example, in SEC v. Cohen, SEC Litigation Release No. 9050 (D.D.C. 1980), the law firm
agreed that it would, in its role as counsel in tax shelter private offerings, exercise due care to
assure themselves that:
(1) Any offering circulars they prepare will contain full and fair disclosure of
all material facts and risks so that the offering document is not materially false
and misleading; and
(2) Any tax opinions they prepare will contain full and fair disclosure of all
facts which bear upon the tax conclusions, and that the firm will have a reason-
able basis for relying upon the disclosed facts in issuing such tax opinions. Fur-
ther, the firm represented that within 45 days it would adopt and maintain
procedures to implement the above-described undertakings.
Id. See Ferrara & Steinberg, The Liability of Tax Practitioners - An SEC Staff Perspective, in
MAJOR TAX PLANNING (1981).
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B SEC Administrative Proceedings
As discussed above, the SEC has procured certain undertakings by law
firms in administrative proceedings. Such undertakings also have been
agreed to in SEC Rule 2(e) proceedings.20 5 Moreover, on fairly rare occa-
sions, the SEC elects to issue a Section 21(a) Report 2 6 rather than institute
an enforcement proceeding. One such Section 21(a) Report involved bond
counsel who, in the Commission's view, performed in an unacceptable man-
ner. Asserting that counsel's inquiry was "totally inadequate and facilitated
the bond closing and bond sales to the public," the Commission, drawing on
ABA Formal Opinion 335,207 stated: "Unless lawyers, carefully and compe-
tently ascertain the relevant facts and make a reasonable inquiry of their
clients to obtain facts not within their personal knowledge, their opinions
may facilitate fraudulent transactions in securities. This is so particularly as
the investing public looks to the lawyer's opinion as a safeguard against vio-
lations of the federal securities laws." 208
In connection with the bringing of administrative enforcement actions,
Section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act grants the SEC authority to bring pro-
ceedings against any person who was a "cause" of a registrant's failure to
comply with certain Exchange Act reporting obligations, including the
proxy and tender offer statutory provisions and SEC rules prescribed there-
under.2°9 As a consequence, the SEC may institute Section 15(c)(4) pro-
ceedings against certain "access" persons, such as securities counsel, who are
a "cause" of a "failure to comply. '210
The Kern matter, which the Commission ultimately dismissed, raised sig-
nificant issues with respect to the proper scope of Section 15(c)(4) proceed-
205. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e); see In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 82,124 (SEC 1979).
206. A key SEC Release explaining the Commission's policy positions in utilizing the Sec-
tion 21(a) Report mechanism is reported at [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,014 (SEC 1979) ("Albert's Inc." Release). See M. STEINBERG & R. FERRARA, supra note
6, § 4:16 ("Although a Section 21(a) report is not actually an adjudicatory type of proceeding,
it is used by the SEC as a substitute for administrative disciplinary or civil injunctive suits in
marginal, nonegregious cases .... ").
207. ABA Formal Opinion 335, 60 A.B.A.J. 488 (1974). See Rice & Steinberg, Legal
Opinions in Securities Transactions, 16 J. CORP. L. - (1991) (forthcoming).
208. Attorney's Conduct in Issuing an Opinion Letter Without Conducting an Inquiry of
Underlying Facts Failed to Comport with Applicable Standards of Conduct, Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 17831, 22 SEC Docket 1200, 1202 (1981). See generally Timmeny,
Responsibilities of Lawyers in Connection with the Sale of Municipal Securities, 36 Bus. LAW.
1799 (1981); National Association of Bond Lawyers Committee on Professional Responsibil-
ity, The Function and Professional Responsibilities of Bond Counsel, 16 URBAN LAW. 489
(1984).
209. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(c)(4) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991). Under Section 15(c)(4) of the
Exchange Act, in regard to any person subject to the provisions of Section 12, 13, 14 or 15(d)
of that Act who fails to comply with any such provision, or rule or regulation promulgated
thereunder, "the Commission may publish its findings and issue an order requiring such per-
son to comply with such provision or such rule or regulation thereunder upon such terms and
conditions and within such time as the Commission may specify in such order."




ings. 2 1 In that proceeding, the administrative law judge (Aid) held that the
subject attorney was a "cause" of the target corporation's (Allied) failure to
amend promptly its Schedule 14D-9 to reflect subsequent material develop-
ments, thereby contributing to the company's failure to comply with Section
14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14d-9 thereunder. The standard of
culpability under Section 15(c)(4) for finding the attorney to be a "cause" of
the violation, according to the ALT, is negligence. 21 2 Although finding the
attorney in violation, the ALJ declined to direct future compliance with re-
spect to issuers other than Allied due to which Section 15(c)(4)'s language
indicates that such future compliance must be connected with the particular
issuer (i.e., Allied) involved, hence rendering "an order of general future
compliance... beyond the scope of Section 15(c)(4)." 213 Because the attor-
ney had no current relationship with Allied (which was no longer a publicly-
held company) and had no control in regard to the company's future compli-
ance, the issuance of an order compelling the attorney to effect Allied's com-
pliance "would be a futile gesture." '2
14
On appeal to the SEC, the Commission affirmed the AL's determination
to discontinue the proceedings on the basis that Section 15(c)(4) does not
provide authority for orders of general future compliance. 21 5 Irrespective of
the SEC's determination, it should be pointed out that the attorney was not
acting only in the role of rendering legal advice to the client. Rather, ac-
cording to the facts as found by the AUJ, Kern, who also was a director of
Allied, "assumed sole responsibility for determining when an amendment to
Allied's Schedule 14D-9 would be filed."' 2 16 Based on this finding, the AUJ
reasoned:
In the usual relationship of lawyer and client Kern would have had only
the responsibility of giving legal advice to [executive] officers of Allied
who in turn would have made the decisions whether amendments to
Allied's Schedule 14D-9 were required. When Kern accepted discre-
tionary authority to make those decisions he also accepted the responsi-
bility the Allied officers had for compliance with Rule 14d-9 and cannot
be heard now to complain that his legal judgments are being second-
guessed in these proceedings. 21 7
Some authorities contend that the Kern matter was an attempt by the
enforcement division to use Section 15(c)(4) in lieu of a civil injunctive ac-
tion. Moreover, it is asserted that allegations that an attorney violated the
federal securities laws should be determined in a federal district court rather
211. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,815 (SEC 1991), aff'd, [Cur-
rent Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 84,342 (AL 1988). Note that the Commis-
sion affirmed "solely the [ALU's] determination to discontinue these proceedings." [Current
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,815.
212. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,342, at 89,591.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 89,595.
215. (Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,815 (SEC 1991).
216. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,342 at 89,587.
217. Id. at 89,592.
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than in an administrative proceeding. 218 Although these contentions have
merit, they overlook Kern's active and exclusive role in the disclosure pro-
cess. This is an important factor. By accepting this status, Kern was doing
more than passively rendering legal advice. Indeed, he became the sole de-
terminer of his client's securities law disclosure obligations. The Kern pro-
ceeding thus illustrates that serving as both director and counsel may incur
unnecessary risk.219
In view of the SEC's resolution of Section 15(c)(4)'s scope in Kern, the
Commission may abandon that provision as an enforcement mechanism
against attorneys. This is due to the passage of the Securities Law Enforce-
ment Remedies Act of 1990220 which, among other provisions, gives the
SEC administrative cease and desist authority to proceed against any person
based on a violation of any statute or rule of the federal securities laws. In
connection with the issuance of such cease and desist orders, the SEC has
authority to require that measures be implemented to ensure future compli-
ance.221 Moreover, such cease and desist authority extends to those who are
a "cause" of the violation, including those who "should have known" that
their conduct "would contribute" to any such violation.222 Needless to say,
such language provides the Commission with broad discretion to proceed
against securities counsel as it deems appropriate. In this regard, counsel
can minimize liability exposure by confining his or her role to that of a legal
advisor (and not taking part in business decisions). 223
VI. INSIDER TRADING
The SEC and U.S. Attorney have instituted a number of actions against
lawyers for insider trading. 224 As the Supreme Court has pointed out, attor-
neys retained by a corporation are treated as insiders with respect to the
information received due to their relationship with their client: "The basis
218. See Block, Levine & Feig, The Kern Decision: An Opportunityfor the SEC to Address
Section 15(c)(4) Proceedings and Administrative Proceedings Against Lawyers Generally, 3 IN-
SIGHTS No. 3, at 23 (Feb. 1989). See also Lawyers Say SEC Should Limit Use of Proceedings
Under Section 15(c)(4), 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1263 (1990).
219. The issue of counsel serving as a director on the client's board is discussed in M.
STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 266-67 (1983).
220. Public Law 101429. See Martin, Mirvis & Herlihy, SEC Enforcement Powers and
Remedies Are Greatly Expanded, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 19 (1991).
221. Indeed, in the Kern proceeding, the SEC remarked that "for the future, the passage of
[the 1990 legislation] renders moot the issue of the Commission's general power." [Current
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,815.
222. See Securities Act § 8A(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77h-l(a) (West Supp. 1991); Exchange Act
§ 21C(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-3(a) (West Supp. 1991); Investment Company Act § 9(F)(1), 15
U.S.C.A. 80a-9(f)(1) (West Supp. 1991); Investment Advisers Act § 203(k)(1), 15 U.S.C.A.
80b-3(k)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
223. See To Our Clients from Pitt & Johnson of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson,
"The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990: A New Era in Enforcement," at 6
(July 1990).
224. See, e.g., United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988); SEC v. Bluestone, 22
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1231 (E.D. Mich. 1990); SEC v. O'Hagen, (1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,852 (D. Minn. 1989); United States v. Elliott, 711 F.
Supp. 425 (N.D. 11. 1989).
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for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a
special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enter-
prise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes. '225
In these circumstances, when such an attorney improperly trades or tips, he
or she will be held liable as an insider. As an alternative rationale, the mis-
appropriation theory may be invoked to hold such attorneys liable. Stated
succinctly, by misappropriating valuable nonpublic information entrusted to
them with the utmost confidentiality, such attorneys who trade or tip engage
in deceptive conduct in violation of the securities laws.226
As several authorities point out, law firms should be concerned with their
liability exposure in this context. 227 Pursuant to Section 21A(b) of the Ex-
change Act, a controlling person, which (depending on the circumstances)
would include a law firm, may be subject to penalties up to $1 million or
three times the amount of any profits realized or losses avoided if such per-
son "knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that such controlled person was
likely to engage in the act or acts constituting the violation and failed to take
appropriate steps to prevent such act or acts before they occurred. ' 228
Given the extent of insider trading that has been engaged in by law firm
personnel, it would be prudent for law firms to adopt and enforce formal
insider trading policies. SEC Chairman Richard Breeden has urged law
firms to implement such policies. 229 The procedures prescribed must fit a
specific firm's characteristics. While a straightforward policy statement may
be appropriate for a law firm not ordinarily practicing commercial law,230
the following elements should be arguably present in policies adopted by
firms engaged in the practice of corporate and securities law: "(1) The state-
ment should enunciate the basic policy against insider trading; (2) [it] should
make clear that it prohibits not only trading but also tipping; (3) the policy
should apply to both client and nonclient securities; and (4) [it should desig-
nate] the persons administering the policy and [those persons] available to
answer questions regarding it."23 1 In addition, the policy should be distrib-
225. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983); see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). For further discussion, see D. Langevoort, Insider
Trading Handbook (1990); M. STEINBERG, supra note 7, § 3.01 et seq. (and sources cited
therein).
227. See Barron, Model Memoranda, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (1989); Eisenberg, Protecting
Against Insider Trading Liability, 22 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 87 (1989); Phillips, Insider
Trading Controls for Law Firms, 23 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 113 (1990); Protecting Your
Firm, A.B.A.J., at 43 (March 1988); Law Firms Need Policies on Confidentiality, Bus. LAW.
UPDATE 3 (Sept.-Oct. 1988).
228. See Section 21A(b) of the Exchange Act. See generally Aldave, The Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: An Analysis and Appraisal, 52 ALBANY L. REV.
893 (1988); Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 68
N.C.L. REv. 465 (1990); Lavoie, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, 22 REv. SEC. & COMM. REG. 1 (1989).
229. See 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1375 (1990).
230. See Eisenberg, supra note 227, at 88.
231. Phillips, supra note 227, at 115.
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uted to all law firm personnel who should sign acknowledgments that they
have read and understand the policy. Education programs should be held,
and law firm personnel should affirm on a periodic basis that they adhere to
the policy. 232
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has provided an overview of the potential liability of attorneys
under the securities laws. The subjects addressed have focused on attorney
liability exposure under primary and secondary theories. Although Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act is the provision most frequently invoked in this
context, several other sections also may apply. Given the increasing number
of lawsuits against attorneys, the securities laws will continue to be vigor-
ously utilized by plaintiffs' counsel to seek recovery for their allegedly ag-
grieved clients. 233
232. Id. See Eisenberg, supra note 227, at 88-89.
233. See DeBenedictis, Lawyer Deep Pockets, 76 A.B.A.J. at 34 (Jan. 1990).
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